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Do citizenship regimes shape political incorporation? Evidence from four 
European cities  
 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines how different formal citizenship regimes fare in achieving the 
political integration of immigrants and their children by looking at turnout in local 
elections. We analyse survey data from four European cities—Geneva, London, Oslo 
and Stockholm—that grant voting rights to foreigners at the local level but are located 
in countries with contrasting rules for access to formal citizenship. Our results 
indicate that local voting gaps are larger where citizenship rules are more restrictive, 
which supports the hypothesis that formal citizenship regimes — mostly determined 
by national legislation — have long-lasting effects on the electoral participation of 
immigrant-background individuals, even when eligibility is extended to foreigners. 
Moreover, we find only marginal differences between generations once citizenship 
status is taken into account, which runs against the assimilation hypothesis and 
confirms the pervasive effects of citizenship regimes on political integration 
outcomes.  
 
KEYWORDS: immigration, citizenship, electoral participation, immigrant 
generations, local elections, turnout. 
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Do citizenship regimes shape political incorporation? Evidence from four 
European cities  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The exclusion of immigrants and their descendants from political voice challenges 
normative beliefs about democratic equality, undermines the process of democratic 
representation and accountability, and could contribute to their social and economic 
exclusion (Jones-Correa, 1998). Voting is one key part of political inclusion, as it 
provides immigrants and their children with an opportunity to participate in the 
selection of their democratic representatives, and to shape policy making in the places 
where they live.  
Indeed, recognizing the importance of suffrage for immigrants’ integration, 
various countries and cities across Europe — including those studied in this article — 
have granted local voting rights to non-(EU) citizens. This has been the case not only 
in societies with more inclusive citizenship legislation, such as Sweden or the United 
Kingdom, but also in places where access to citizenship is more restricted, as in 
Norway and  the canton of Geneva, in Switzerland. Thus, there is no automatic 
correspondence between the inclusiveness of formal citizenship rules and the rules 
governing local voting rights for non-citizens. 
In this article we examine whether the openness or restrictiveness of 
citizenship acquisition rules — almost always determined by national legislation — 
has a lasting effect on the political inclusion of immigrant-background minorities, 
even in settings where formal barriers to their political participation have been 
significantly lowered. In essence, do national citizenship regimes shape the political 
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behaviour of migrant minorities, and sustain political inequalities, even when local 
voting rights are granted to foreigners? 
We contend that citizenship rules still matter. The rules of access to formal 
citizenship are an influential expression of the receiving country’s vision and 
philosophy in relation to the inclusion of immigrants. Formal citizenship rules are 
likely to influence the perceptions of immigrants and their children about how much 
the receiving societies welcome them as members of the polity and, consequently, 
will reinforce (or reduce) the inclusionary effect of local voting rights for foreigners. 
In order to assess the hypothesis that formal citizenship rules shape political 
inequalities at the local level, even in the absence of formal barriers to participation in 
local elections, we examine turnout gaps between migrants and autochthonous 
populations in four European cities: Geneva (Switzerland), Oslo (Norway), London 
(United Kingdom) and Stockholm (Sweden).
1
 These four cases are similar in that they all are large cosmopolitan cities 
where foreign residents have been granted local voting rights. Yet they are located in 
countries with substantially different formal citizenship regimes according to various 
classifications (Koopmans et al., 2005, Niessen et al., 2007, Howard, 2009, 
Huddleston et al., 2011). All these classifications agree that Sweden and the UK have 
some of the most liberal citizenship legislations in Europe, whereas Norway’s and 
Switzerland’s are among the most restrictive ones.  
In the next section we discuss how citizenship models may shape turnout for 
immigrants and their children. Then we present the data and describe the methods 
employed. We follow with a discussion of the results, and conclude by highlighting 
the theoretical and policy-relevant underpinnings of our findings. To anticipate our 
main results, we find that regardless of inclusive local voting rules, turnout gaps 
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between migrant-background and autochthonous electors seem to reflect differences 
in citizenship rules: voting gaps are larger where citizenship rules are more restrictive. 
 
2. HOW CITIZENSHIP MODELS SHAPE THE ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION 
OF IMMIGRANT-BACKGROUND VOTERS 
Different citizenship models, designed mostly at the national level, have been shown 
to display a substantial impact on the degree of (and paths to) political integration of 
immigrants and their children (Ireland, 2000, Koopmans and Statham, 2000, 
Bloemraad, 2006). In particular, they have been shown to be important in shaping 
different patterns of collective mobilization and political claims-making by 
immigrants and ethnic minorities (Koopmans et al., 2005, Giugni and Passy, 2004, 
Cinalli and Giugni, 2011). However, the evidence is limited and less conclusive when 
the outcome to be explained is turnout (González-Ferrer, 2011) and the scarce 
comparative studies available do not address this issue directly (Bird et al., 2011).  
Despite these early findings concerning the relevance of national citizenship 
models for immigrants’ political participation, some authors have argued that 
variations within countries, especially at the local level, are also consequential in 
shaping the integration of immigrant-background minorities (Bousetta, 2000, 
Garbaye, 2002, Morales and Giugni, 2011). These studies emphasize that local 
councils enact policies that shape migrants’ everyday lives, including their 
opportunities and incentives for political participation, not necessarily in a consistent 
way with the national policies. Granting local voting rights for all immigrants — 
including foreigners — is viewed as a perfect example in this regard, since it may 
somehow counterbalance the political inequalities that remain at the national level for 
immigrant populations, and promote their integration. However, the relative 
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importance of the local versus the national opportunity structures has hardly been 
empirically examined. 
Here we contend that there are reasons to expect that local opportunities for 
participation will only have a limited capacity to shape the political integration of 
migrant minorities, even if local voting rights are granted to foreigners, and that 
national citizenship models will still exert a powerful influence. Citizenship regimes 
send signals about who ‘belongs to us’ and is welcome as a full member of the social 
and political community, and who is not. Countries that establish very demanding 
conditions for naturalization often justify their approach as the way to ensure that their 
new citizens are as similar as possible to natives in aspects like language fluency, 
allegiance to the country, and civic values. However, it is not self-evident that by 
imposing longer waiting periods and tougher requirements to apply for citizenship, 
these countries will select individuals who are also more similar to natives in terms of 
their political orientations, their interest in politics and their attachment to the host 
country. In other words, more restrictive formal citizenship regimes send an 
exclusionary message to people of immigrant background, and this message might not 
be automatically off-set by extending local voting rights to foreigners. 
Because immigrants and their descendants are a very heterogeneous group 
with respect to their citizenship status and place of birth, we should not treat them as a 
single indistinct category. First generation immigrants were born (and in most cases 
raised and socialized) in the country of origin, whereas second generations are all 
native to the country of their parents’ settlement. Yet, in many European countries, 
both first and second generations include citizens (through naturalization, by birth, or 
by acquisition at a young age) and foreigners. Thus, for first generation migrants, 
citizenship rules determine how long they need to wait before they can naturalize. For 
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second generations more restrictive citizenship rules mean that they can be socialized 
into politics as foreigners in the country where they were born and raised, which may 
lead to detachment and feelings of alienation. This could reduce the assimilative effect 
of being born and raised in the country. In fact, some scholars refer to the differing 
levels of integration among first and subsequent generations as the “immigrant 
paradox,” suggesting that the first generation shows higher levels of adaptation to the 
post-migration context than the second, and that over-time adaptation of the native-
born youth may decline (Berry et al., 2006). As a consequence, for both first and 
second generation residents, we hypothesize that in places where citizenship rules are 
more restrictive, all immigrant-background residents will be less inclined to vote in 
elections than the autochthonous population, even if local opportunities to participate 
are ample because of extended voting rights for foreigners.  
 
3. CASES, HYPOTHESES, DATA AND METHODS 
To examine if voting gaps in local elections vary in a consistent way with formal 
citizenship regimes, we compare four cities that have all granted local voting rights to 
foreigners but that are located in countries with different rules concerning citizenship 
acquisition: Geneva, Oslo, Stockholm and London. Foreigners are required twelve, 
seven and five years of residence in Geneva, Oslo and Stockholm, respectively, to 
apply for naturalization; in London, only three. In addition, native-born children of 
foreign immigrants are not automatically citizens in the former three cities, because 
ius sanguinis prevails. However, whereas in Geneva and Oslo they can enter 
adulthood as foreigners, in Sweden, the liberal regime of citizenship acquisition by 
notification after 5 years of residence means that most children of permanent foreign 
residents will be citizens well before adolescence. In the UK, ius soli dominates and 
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all native-born children of foreign residents with indefinite leave to remain are 
automatically British nationals.  
Both Howard’s (2009) Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) for 1980 and 2008, and 
the MIPEX index for 2007 and 2010 confirm that Switzerland and Norway are 
appropriately described as closed or restrictive citizenship regimes, whereas Sweden 
and the UK can be described as more liberal in their citizenship rules. In all tables and 
figures we order the cities from more restrictive (Geneva) to more liberal 
(Stockholm), in accordance with the relative ranking provided by MIPEX (Table 1). 
 
 [TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
 
Despite these different national citizenship rules, the four cities are comparable 
in several important aspects: they are centres of large metropolitan regions with strong 
economies, and in all of them migrant-background individuals constitute a sizeable 
minority with potentially large electoral leverage.  As summarized in Table 2, 
migrant-origin residents make up at least 20 percent of the population (in Stockholm) 
and as much as half of all residents, in the case of London.  They all recognize local 
voting rights to foreigners, although in Geneva, 8 years of residence are required to be 
eligible, whereas in Oslo and Stockholm this drops to three, and in London, there is 
no minimum length of residence.  
 
[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
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Our theoretical expectation is that turnout gaps between immigrant-
background individuals and the majority population will be larger in the cities with 
more restrictive national citizenship rules (Hypothesis 1) — Geneva and Oslo — and 
especially for the non-citizen voters (Hypothesis 2). Moreover, as explained before, 
we expect these larger gaps in Geneva and Oslo not only for first but also second 
generations. 
 
The data employed to assess these hypotheses comes from a collaborative European 
project that conducted surveys with representative random samples of immigrant-
background and autochthonous populations in several European cities between 2003 
and 2008. In each of the cities, the survey targeted a control group of autochthonous 
residents and two or three groups of immigrant origin. The immigrant-background 
groups were selected so that they were sizeable groups in each city, and that they 
represented different waves of migration and religious backgrounds (see Table 2).
2
  
Immigrant-origin respondents were targeted irrespective of citizenship or legal status, 
as long as they had resided in the city for at least 6 months. Our analysis here focuses 
on respondents eligible to vote in local elections, which results in subsamples of 
various sizes across the cities that reflects differences in the local residency 
requirements.
3
 
The questionnaires included a wide range of items from basic socio-
demographic individual characteristics to detailed information about respondents’ 
political and civic engagement. Respondents were asked about their country of birth, 
year of arrival in the country and city of residence, educational level, language 
fluency, marital and employment status. Crucial for our analysis, they were also asked 
to list the citizenship(s) they held at the time of the survey, as well as their 
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citizenship(s) at birth and that of their parents (sometimes even their grandparents’). 
By combining all these pieces of information, we are able to distinguish between first 
and second generations of immigrant background. The questionnaire asked about 
eligibility and electoral participation in the most recent national, regional and local 
elections of the country of residence.
4
 Thus, we can examine turnout gaps between the 
autochthonous population (our reference group) and different subgroups of the 
population with an immigrant background. 
 
 
4. THE TURNOUT GAP FOR IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 
We find substantial cross-city variation in turnout rates for local elections, as seen in 
Table 3. In most cases, both first and second generations are less likely to turn out 
than the autochthonous, with the exception of the naturalized first generations in 
London and Stockholm, both located in countries with more liberal citizenship 
regimes. This is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
In contradiction with the assimilation approach,  second generation citizens are 
less inclined to vote than the naturalized first generation in their respective cities, with 
the only exception of Geneva, where both groups show similar participation rates. 
This could be because of the younger age profile, on average, of the second 
generation citizens, but citizenship might also have a role to play. Second generation 
residents with citizenship participate more than first generation foreigners (except in 
Stockholm), but growing up in the country produces no differences in participation 
when the second generation remain foreigners into adulthood.  Thus, foreign voters, 
regardless of whether they are first or second generation, remain, as expected, the 
least participative group, which supports our main contention that suppressing formal 
12 
 
barriers to voting rights at the local level does not automatically erase political 
exclusion. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that for the only two cases where we had 
sufficient samples of children of mixed marriages (Geneva and London), they show 
opposite patterns: in Geneva, their behaviour is more similar to the native population 
than to second generations while in London it is indistinguishable from the other 
immigrant-background groups. This supports the idea that children of mixed 
marriages should not be automatically lumped together with those who have no 
native-born parent (Ramakrishnan, 2004). 
 
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
 
Overall, these results are broadly consistent with our expectation that turnout 
gaps between immigrant-background individuals and the autochthonous population 
will be larger in those societies with more restrictive citizenship acquisition rules 
(Hypothesis 1), as turnout gaps are larger in Oslo and Geneva than in London and 
Stockholm. The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that these gaps will be 
larger for the foreign voters (Hypothesis 2), as they are vastly larger in Geneva than in 
all other cities.
5
 Additionally, as we anticipated, these results also challenge the idea 
that the greater ‘selectivity’ intended by more restrictive naturalization regimes will 
translate automatically into greater political integration or assimilation. 
Nevertheless, some of the differences between the majority population and 
immigrant-background individuals might be accounted for by different socio-
demographic characteristics across groups and generations. Therefore, we conducted 
multivariate logistic regressions of turnout in local elections to estimate the voting 
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gaps once key characteristics associated with voting are controlled for. We summarise 
the main results in Figure 1, which depicts the probability of voting (the solid 
diamond) for each of the relevant groups we want to compare, and the 95 per cent 
confidence intervals of the estimation of the probabilities (the bars).
6
 The first overall 
result is that, in most cases, the turnout gaps between autochthonous and immigrant-
background electors are moderate in magnitude, except in the most restrictive 
environment — Geneva — which is in line with our initial expectation of larger gaps 
in most restrictive citizenship regimes. 
However, the main finding is that, rather than generational differences, what 
matters most is the citizenship status: in all cities foreigners are between a half and a 
third less likely to cast a ballot than the autochthonous population. This is fully 
consistent with Hypothesis 2. Moreover, the turnout gap between foreign voters and 
the autochthonous population is largest in the society with the most restrictive 
citizenship regime (Geneva) and smallest in the society with the most liberal one 
(Stockholm), as Hypothesis 1 predicted, 
The results of the model also suggest that age is positively related to turnout in 
all cities, whereas gender is only a significant predictor in London, with a negative 
effect. Educational attainment is in all cases but Oslo positively related to the 
inclination to vote while being employed only matters in London and Oslo. In terms 
of other integration indicators, it is interesting to note that having an autochthonous 
spouse/partner is only important in Geneva, the proportion of one’s life spent in the 
country is only relevant in Geneva and Oslo, and language fluency is not a significant 
predictor in any of the cities studied primarily because most of the eligible voters are 
fluent in the language of the country/locality.
7
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[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our analyses indicate that there is some evidence to support widely held views about 
the effect of citizenship models on migrants’ political engagement, at least when 
judged by their turnout in local elections. A turnout gap between immigrant-
background and autochthonous residents exists in all cities. This gap is to some extent 
attributable to socio-demographic characteristics, such as age and educational levels. 
However, after controlling for socio-demographics, the gap remains significant and 
larger in the places with more restrictive citizenship models — Geneva and Oslo. One 
reason that some countries enact more restrictive citizenship regimes is that they see it 
as a pathway to greater political integration; yet, our results challenge this assumption, 
as turnout gaps between the naturalized immigrants and the autochthonous population 
are larger in the more restrictive countries. 
On the other hand, the dominant view that participatory gaps should be larger 
for first generation immigrants than for their native-born children, in line with the 
assimilation hypothesis, is also not supported by our results. We find only marginal 
differences between generations once citizenship status is taken into account. 
Moreover, the gap between the autochthonous population and the native-born second 
generation of immigrant-background is non-existent in the two societies with more 
open citizenship rules, but significant for the two cases with more restrictive 
approaches to nationality acquisition. The turnout gap is particularly large in the 
Swiss case, where the rules are most restrictive and where many native-born children 
of immigrants grow up as foreigners in the only country they have ever lived in. 
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In conclusion, while the evidence with four cases can only be suggestive, our 
data indicate that different approaches to formal citizenship shape the patterns of 
electoral behaviour of immigrant-background individuals. Contrary to what has been 
the prevalent view, there is some evidence to suggest that the effects are as large for 
the native-born children of immigrants as for first generations. If this is the case, 
restrictive citizenship approaches may have the perverse result of sustaining the 
political inequalities affecting most first generation migrants, even if formal barriers 
to electoral participation are suppressed. Moreover, these inequalities may even 
perpetuate over generations, possibly through political socialization mechanisms. 
However, more research is needed to ascertain whether these effects and their 
direction are consistent in a larger number of societies, and whether patterns are the 
same for national elections. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Formal rules on access to formal citizenship in our selected countries 
 Ius Solis Length of 
residence 
requirement 
Dual 
Citizenship 
Citizenship 
Policy 
Index (0-6) 
Ranking 
MIPEX  
(0-100) 
 1980 2005 1980 2005 1980 2005 1980 2005 2007 2010 
Switzerland No No 12 12 No Yes 0 2 36 36 
Norway No No 7 7 No No 1 1 41 41 
Sweden No No 5 5 No Yes 2 4 79 79 
UK Yes Yes 3 3 Yes Yes 6 6 75 59 
 
Notes: Howard’s CPI does not include either Switzerland or Norway. We have collected the necessary 
information and followed the coding rules given in the Appendix of Howard (2005) to classify these 
two countries accordingly. MIPEX collects a larger number of indicators that CPI, and weights 
differently dual citizenship. 
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Table 2.  The cities 
 GEN OSL LON
+
 STO 
Socio-demographics     
Population (million) 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.9 
Percentage of 
migrants 
42.8 25 50.6* 20.5 
Voting rights     
Year granted local 
voting rights for 
foreigners 
2005 1983 1949 1975 
Length residence 
required to vote 
8 3 0 3 
Additional 
requirements 
Registration for 
some 
No EU or 
Commonwealth 
citizen + registration 
No 
Survey     
Year of survey 2006-07 2004 2007-08 2003-04 
Migrant groups 
included in survey 
Italians, 
Kosovars 
Bosnian, 
Pakistani & 
Turkish 
Bangladeshi, Black 
Caribbean & Indian 
Chilean & 
Turkish 
Source: Population, OECD Regional Statistics, 2006-2007 (TL3 level); percentage migrants, respective 
local government statistics. 
+ Only for the North Inner London boroughs of Islington, Camden, Hackney, and Haringey. 
* Ethnic minority population, not foreign-born population. The foreign born were 33 per cent in 2010. 
 
 
19 
 
 Table 3. Self-reported turnout rates in local elections by group and city, 
percentages (N of eligible voters) 
 GEN OSL LON STO 
Autochthonous 73 87 44 87 
(159) (297) (227) (319) 
1st generation citizens 54 62 46 87 
(110) (477) (171) (287) 
1
st
 generation foreigners 37 
(170) 
41 
(220) 
23 
(150) 
72 
(83) 
2
nd
 generation citizens 55 52 30 64 
(56) (75) (407) (79) 
2
nd
 generation foreigners 5 
(21) 
50 
(8) 
-- 
(1) 
-- 
(4) 
Children mixed couples 72 73 30 71 
(89) (11) (70) (14) 
     
Total eligible voters 
 
(605) (1088) (1026) (776) 
    
     
Ratio migrants/autocht. 0.67** 0.64** 0.72** 0.93* 
Ratio 1
st 
citizens/autocht.
 0.74** 0.71** 1.04 1.00 
Ratio 1
st 
foreigners/authocht. 
0.51** 0.47** 0.52** 0.83** 
Ratio 2
nd 
citizens/authocht.  0.75** 0.70** 0.68** 0.73** 
Ratio 2
nd 
foreigners/autocht. 0.07** 0.57** -- -- 
Ratio mixed/autochthonous 0.99 0.84 0.68* 0.82 
Significant at *0.05, ** at 0.01. -- Not enough cases. 
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Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of voting in local elections, by city and group 
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st
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nd
 generation foreigner. 
21 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Results presented in this article stem from integrated datasets produced by the project “Multicultural 
Democracy and Immigrants’ Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public 
Policies at the Local Level (LOCALMULTIDEM)”. This project was funded by the European Commission 
under the 6
th
 Framework Programme’s Priority 7 “Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-Based 
Society” as a STREP instrument (contract no. CIT5-CT-2005-028802). Additionally, the Swedish and 
Norwegian data were collected with funding from the Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, the Swedish 
Council for Working Life and Social Research, and the Research Council of Norway, respectively. The 
data for Geneva was collected with funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant no. 
100012-109429). The authors want to acknowledge the work of the following colleagues in the production 
of the original datasets:  Marco Giugni, Mario Diani, Paul Statham, Manlio Cinalli, Endre Sik, Bo 
Bengtsson, and Jon Rogstad. 
2
 The surveys were conducted in person in London, Oslo and Stockholm, and by phone in Geneva due 
to the high cost of face-to-face surveys in Switzerland. See Morales and Giugni (2011) for more details 
on the characteristics of the samples. In our samples, there are no relevant differences between the 
autochthonous population and the first generations of immigrants in terms of their age profile, but 2
nd
 
generations and children of mixed marriages tend to be much younger — especially in Oslo and 
Stockholm, where more than 50 per cent are less than 36 years old. All groups are much more balanced 
in terms of gender, though first generations in London and second generations in Oslo are 
predominantly male — both at 61 per cent. 
3
 The more restrictive requirements in Geneva – 8 years of residence - mean that 55 per cent of the 
migrant-background individuals interviewed in that city were not eligible to vote in local elections, as 
they reported in response to our questionannire; thus, they are excluded from our analyses. The 
equivalent figure was 11 per cent for Oslo, 8 per cent for London and 7 per cent for Stockholm, 
reflecting less demanding rules for eligibility. Hence, the immigrant-background electorate in Geneva 
is more ‘selective’ — at least in terms of length of residence — and less representative of the overall 
immigrant-background population in that city than the respective electorates in the other cities studied. 
4
 The exact wording of the questions was: ‘Sometimes people don’t vote because they cannot or 
because they don’t want to. Did you vote in the last [name of host country parliament] elections, or was 
there anything that made you unable or unwilling to vote? (INT: If respondent answers no, ask if he/she 
was eligible to vote or not.) And did you vote in the last local elections? (INT: If respondent answers 
no, ask if he/she was eligible to vote or not.)’ 
5
 Of course, the fact that we focus on the citizen/foreign distinction does not mean that the national 
origin of the immigrant groups is irrelevant. However, our analyses (not shown) indicate that these 
gaps hold for most migrant groups studied across cities. 
6
 We run four separate logistic regression models, one per city, with the same control variables: 
citizenship of the country of residence, age (also in quadratic form), gender, educational level, 
employment status, whether in a relationship (married or with partner) or not, spouse/partner is 
autochthonous, more than half of respondent’s life spent in the host country, and fluent in country/city 
language. The model also included a dummy for the children of mixed couples, but given the lack of 
precision in the estimations due to sample sizes, we have left this group out of the graph. The 
probabilities in Figure 1 have been calculated for a hypothetical 40 years-old male respondent who is 
employed, with an educational level equal to the mean educational level in his city of residence, living 
with a non-autochthonous partner, who has lived in the country for more than half of his life and is 
fluent in the country/city language. 
7
 The non-fluent eligible respondents are 13 per cent in Geneva, 12 in Oslo, 9 in London and 7 in 
Stockholm. 
